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Abstract: Lagging investments in German hospitals have become a serious challenge in recent decades. 
The responsibility for investment financing lies with the German federal states, the “Bundeslaender”, due 
to the dualistic financing framework applying for German hospitals. Yet, hospital investments experience a 
field of tension between the availability of financial resources and necessary investments. A possible solu-
tion could be a financial equalization scheme for the health economy incorporating an earmarked fund for 
hospital investments. The rationale for such a system is that health economies of federal states do not 
represent single closed systems, but depend on interregional trade flows to supply patient treatment. The 
respective calculations in this paper are based on our recently compiled Multiregional Health Account for 
Germany. The model represents a satellite account of the health economy based on national accounts. 
Consequently, we are able to calculate spillover effects from patient treatment in federal states by conduct-
ing input-output analysis. Based on the results, we derive a sketch of a financial equalization scheme in 
order to ensure needs-based hospital infrastructure in German federal states.  
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1 Introduction 
For a long time, health care supply has been perceived as an economic burden (Hilbert et. al., 2002).  From 
the mid-1990s on, however, a paradigm shift shaped its perception in Germany (Goldschmidt & Hilbert, 
2009). Health care supply was no longer seen as a cost factor exclusively, but also as an important con-
tributor to economic growth, employment and international trade. In addition, a definition of the health econ-
omy was established, according to which it comprises both health care services and products, ‘which serve 
for prevention as well as for the provision of health and for rehabilitation.’ (BioCon Valley, 2005).  
This additional perspective was supported by activities of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy from 2010 on (Henke et al., 2010; Ostwald et al., 2014; BMWi, 2015; Schneider, et al., 2016; BMWi, 
2016; BMWi, 2017a). These activities concentrated on developing and updating the National Health Ac-
count (NHA) for Germany, which quantifies the economic contribution of the health economy to the German 
economy in total. The underlying methodology is based on the macroeconomic framework of national ac-
counts, incorporates official data on health expenditures and follows international standards (Schwärzler & 
Kronenberg, 2016).  
The NHA reveals a high heterogeneity among single categories of the health economy in terms of their 
contribution to gross value added (GVA), employment and trade. In addition, first attempts to establish a 
similar database on the federal state level stressed different characteristics among regions of Germany 
(Ostwald et al., 2015a; Ostwald et al., 2015b; Ostwald et al. 2014, 2015c; Ostwald & Schwärzler, 2015; 
Ranscht, 2009; AG GGRdL, 2016; Schneider, 2013, 2014; BASYS & GÖZ, 2012). In order to establish a 
data base, which incorporates both the heterogeneity of involved categories and of regions in a consistent 
manner, we compiled the Multiregional Health Account (MRHA). It corresponds to the national model in 
terms of methodology and overall results but adds a further component in terms of regional diversification 
(BMWi, 2017b; Schwärzler & Kronenberg, 2017a; Schwärzler & Kronenberg 2017b). The underlying meth-
odology of both the NHA and the MRHA is based on national accounts and hence allows to conduct input-
output analysis. The latter is frequently used to study several fields of policy action (Eurostat, 2008).  
Hence, we pursue to apply input-output analysis in the context of the health economy in this paper not only 
to address a current serious challenge in German health policy but also to demonstrate the relevance of 
the health economy in the political context. In this framework, we establish an approach to cope with lagging 
investments in hospitals by making use of multiregional input-output analysis.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes background and challenges of 
lagging investments in German hospitals. We discuss existing approaches and address the problem for-
mulation in section 3. Section 4 describes the data base and the empirical approach used in order to es-
tablish the financial equalization scheme that aims to cope with lagging investments in hospitals. We pre-
sent and discuss the results in section 5, followed by concluding remarks in section 6.  
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2 Background and challenges in the context of investments in German hospitals  
This section aims at describing the general setting of hospital investments. Subsection 2.1 focusses on 
determining factors, which is existing heterogeneities among federal states and the policy setting influenc-
ing hospital investments. Subsection 2.2 describes the current situation on lagging investments in German 
hospitals and subsection 2.3 addresses future challenges, which may even toughen the existing situation.  
2.1 Determining factors 
In this subsection, we first describe regional heterogeneities regarding influencing factors of health in order 
to establish a fundamental understanding for the regional setting of the subsequent analysis. Second, we 
introduce the legal framework regulating the financing responsibilities of hospital investments. Third, we 
evaluate existing compensation mechanisms in order to figure out whether sufficient attention is paid to 
federal states’ responsibilities in this matter.  
2.1.1 Heterogeneities among federal states 
Influencing determinants of peoples’ health status represent important aspects for the design of a health 
system. A high heterogeneity concerning demographic constitution, life expectancy and status of health 
across federal states requires a regionally differentiating health policy. Both health expenditures and de-
mand for inpatient health care supply are affected by current and future heterogeneities of federal states.  
  
In Figure 1, we observe expenses per person insured under the statutory health insurance scheme in Ger-
man districts. Figure 2 exhibits the same expenses, but adjusted by gender, age and morbidity derived from 
conducting a regression analysis on several defined risk categories of patients’ characteristics (Drösler, et 
al., 2011). Hence, we observe the reasonability of these influencing factors on health expenditures and 
therefore on financing of the health care system. We also observe higher costs in Eastern Germany, which 
Figure 2: Adjusted expenditures for 
publicly insured people, 2009 
Source: Göpffarth (2011). Source: Göpffarth (2011). 
Figure 1: Expenses per insured peo-
ple, statutory health insurance, 2009 
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reflects a certain relationship with regional characteristics. There are also additional, so far unconsidered, 
influencing factors, which still cause differences in expenditures even after this adjustment.   
Needs-based health care is a major criterion for health care provision (SVR-G, 2014). It pursues equal 
treatment in qualitative and quantitative measures in accordance to objective patient needs. This implies 
that the severity and kind of illness decides upon the treatment irrespective of the patient’s financial and 
family status, income, gender, place of residence, profession, social background or origin.  
Hence, supply of needs-based health care has to cope with several influencing factors, which exhibit certain 
interdependencies to regional characteristics. In this paper, we focus on one prerequisite of needs-based 
health care, which is hospital infrastructure. 
2.1.2 Hospital Finance Act 
The Hospital Finance Act regulates financing of expenditures in German hospitals (KHG, 1972). It goes 
back to the year 1972 and was revised in 2016. Its purpose aim at safeguarding the economic basis of 
hospitals in order to supply high-quality, patient- and needs-based health care for the population by means 
of efficient, high-quality and independently economizing hospitals. Over here, we again find the term 
‘needs-based health care’. It implies that the quality of treatment is supposed to apply in accordance to 
objective patient needs in all hospitals.  
According to the Hospital Financing Act, the financing of private, public and charitable hospitals is per-
formed in a dualistic way. Operating costs, including expenses for treatments, are financed by health insur-
ance funds on the one hand. On the other hand, investments are financed by public funds of the federal 
states.  
Investment expenditures include costs for construction of hospitals next to purchasing and replacement of 
fixed assets. It does not include costs for properties. The kind of public investment can be distinguished 
between individual and global funding. The first applies upon request to expenses of new buildings, modi-
fications and extension of hospitals, next to purchasing and replacement of fixed assets with useful life over 
three years. Global funding addresses annually expenses for replacements of short-term assets and minor 
construction measures.  
Current challenges regarding financing of investments in hospitals led to adjustments in the Hospital Fi-
nancing Act in 2016. Accordingly, federal states are currently obligated to provide at least the annual aver-
age amount of the years 2012 to 2014 for further investments in hospitals in each year from 2016 to 2018. 
On top to this, and therefore unrelated to investments, 500 M. € are provided for restructuring of hospitals, 
such as initiatives regarding scaling down excess capacities or concentration of locations.  
Observed heterogeneities among federal states regarding age, gender and morbidity hence influence fi-
nancial resources of health insurance funds and federal states. Therefore, we focus on existing compen-
sation mechanisms, which may influence the regionally different characteristics of health care financing in 
the following.  
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2.1.3 Existing compensation mechanisms in the German health system 
Since hospital financing is performed according to a dualistic framework, there are two compensation mech-
anisms with potential influence on respective financial resources. On the one hand, the morbidity-oriented 
risk structure compensation (Morbi-RSA) focusses on compensating expenditures among health insurance 
companies in terms of age, gender and morbidity of patients. On the other hand, the Federal Financial 
Equalization System (Länderfinanzausgleich) distributes revenues among federal states so the latter are 
able to fulfill their assigned tasks.  
Both compensation mechanisms are relevant in our case. We want to gather arguments for compensation 
from the Morbi-RSA, which do not only apply to current expenditures, but also to financing of investments. 
The Federal Financial Equalization System is not related to health, but aims to enable federal states to fulfill 
their duties. Clearly, we exhibit a direct link to financing of hospital infrastructure at this point. We describe 
main characteristics of both in the following.  
The Morbi-RSA aims to enable both solidarity and competition in the statutory health insurance market 
(BVA, 2008). Solidarity applies since the patient’s contribution rate does not depend on health risk but on 
income. Moreover, statutory health insurance is subject to the obligation to contract, irrespective of age, 
gender or well-being of the person. Under normal circumstances, competition for young and healthy indi-
viduals would arise among insurance companies. The Morbi-RSA, however, aims to adjust influencing fac-
tors of insurers’ characteristics in order to enable fair competition among health insurance companies based 
on effective and efficient economizing only. In Figure 1 and Figure 2 we can observe the difference between 
‘original’ health expenditures and health expenditures subject to adjustments according to the Morbi-RSA 
in terms of age, gender, morbidity and reduced earning capacity. Some literature suggests there are addi-
tional so far unconsidered exogenous regional factors, which influence supply and demand of health care, 
such as level of prices and income (Ulrich & Wille, 2014; Göpffarth, 2011). Hence, they propose to imple-
ment a regional factor to the Morbi-RSA to increase fairness of competition among health insurance com-
panies in addition.  
We suggest that differences in demand for health care regarding age, gender and morbidity among others, 
apply not only to current costs, but also to investments of hospitals. Federal states and their hospitals just 
as much need to be able to supply needs-based health care, run their business economically and compete 
in a fair environment, which is independent of the financial resources of federal states. The Morbi-RSA has 
no effects on financial resources of federal states. Hence, we turn to the Federal Financial Equalization 
System in the next step, aiming to figure out whether it copes with regional heterogeneity in health care 
supply in a similar way the Morbi-RSA does.  
Since tax revenues are unequally distributed among German regions due to a diversified economy, certain 
instruments are necessary to ensure federal states to be able to meet their responsibilities. The existing 
Federal Financial Equalization System is meant to represent this instrument and aims to establish ‘equiva-
lent living conditions throughout the federal territory’, based on the German Constitution (Lenk, 2008). Fig-
ure 3 exhibits the preliminary calculations of the Federal Financial Equalization System for 2016 in order to 
enable a general assessment on its impact for the reader.   
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The legal framework of the German Federal Financial Equalization System is revised at the moment. Basic 
principles, to be applied from 2020 on, have already been settled. Unfortunately, it turns out that the reor-
ganization did not lead to the intended reduction in complexity of the redistribution mechanisms. Hence it 
lacks improvements, which make it more transparent, systemic and computable in order to fuel financial 
incentives of federal states (BMF, 2017b). 
Figure 3: Preliminary calculations of the German equalization scheme for 2016.  
 
Source: own illustration based on BMF (2017a). 
According to the recent adjustments, the federal government will support federal states with a higher 
amount of additional 9.5 Bn. € from 2020 on in order to enable them to meet their responsibilities. Associ-
ated therewith, the completion of tasks of the federal states will be adjusted and the competencies of the 
federal government regarding investment decisions will be increased. Special attention is brought to invest-
ments in education, federal motorways, the indebted federal states Saarland and Bremen, seaports and 
Local Community Transport. Apart from this, value-added tax continues to be distributed among federal 
states in consideration of the number of inhabitants (BMF, 2016a).  
So far, we observe no special attention to health. Therefore, we take a closer look at the applied distribution 
concept based on the number of inhabitants, which may impact health-related characteristics. Different 
weights apply for inhabitants in order to include certain characteristics of federal states. This is 1.35 for city 
states, 1.05 for Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 1.03 for Brandenburg and 1.02 for Saxony-Anhalt. This 
weighting is argued with higher financial needs for city states and sparsely populated regions. The ratio of 
actual financial capacity and the accordingly weighted target figure reflects the relative position of a federal 
state. A value below 1 indicates the federal state in consideration is entitled to receive funds and vice versa. 
Allocation does not lead to a complete equalization of tax revenues, in order to maintain incentives for 
effective economizing (Lenk, 2008).  
Hence, we observe a relatively unspecific mechanism to distribute financial resources. Reform proposals 
suggested to assert fixed amounts to investments for education, science, family policy, environment and 
nature protection (Lenk, 2008). Moreover, different literature addresses implementing health-related fac-
tors, which enable rural regions to keep up with economic and social developments and prevent a further 
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growing disparity among regions (Kersten et al, 2015). In addition, a demographic factor was discussed in 
order to consider a decreasing population. However, this is challenging, since the direction of interdepend-
encies of expenditures and demographic constitution depends on the applied field, such as education or 
health among others (BMF, 2013). Moreover, the weighting factors applied on the number of inhabitants 
are criticized by some commentators, who argue that in the case of city states the weighting is too high and 
too general (SVR, 2014) and does not represent a reliable and verifiable indicator (Bönte & Lucke, 2004). 
In addition, it has been argued that the weighting factors for sparsely populated regions lack a clear scien-
tific foundation (Fuest & Thöne, 2012).  
So far, we conclude that influencing factors of health are not a subject of the current and future Federal 
Financial Equalization System. However, since there are adjustments in current expenses regarding gen-
der, age and morbidity in the context of the Morbi-RSA, we can clearly identify need for action regarding 
the financial resources of the federal states in the context of health.  
2.2 Current situation on the lagging investments in German hospitals 
Federal states increasingly fail to comply their obligation to finance investments in hospitals (BDO & DKI, 
2015, SVR-G, 2014). To a reasonable amount, this is due to a lack of their financial resources (Clade, 
2002; Henke, 2002; Rehborn & Thomae, 2008; Porther & Guth, 2012). An analysis conducted by Rösel 
(2013) confirms this interdependency among other influencing factors such as interest burden and demo-
graphic constitution.  
Federal states financed about 2.79 Bn. € investments in hospitals in 2015. This is about half of the 6.01 Bn. 
€ projected required investments for 2016. The aforementioned amount of the yearly necessary investment 
needs of hospitals is derived from investment allocation assessments, which were recently elaborated by 
the DRG Institute for Hospital Reimbursement (InEK) on behalf of the German Hospital Federation (DKG), 
the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds (GKV-Spitzenverband) and the Private Health 
Insurance Association according to the official mandate of § 10 the Hospital Finance Act (KHG). Moreover, 
the 2.79 Bn. € hospital investments financed by federal states corresponds to a 50 percent real erosion in 
value since 1991. The investment ratio, calculated as the quota of investments and adjusted costs of hos-
pitals, decreased from 9.7 percent in 1991 to 3.3 percent in 2015. (DKG, 2017) Nominal development of 
GDP, adjusted costs of hospitals and public investments in hospitals are depicted in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4: GDP, adjusted costs of hospitals2 and public investments in hospitals, 1991-2015 
 
Public financing of hospital investments  GDP  adjusted costs of hospitals 
Source: DKG (2017). 
Financing of federal states corresponds to only half of actual hospital investments (BDO & DKI, 2015). 
From an economic perspective necessary additional investments are financed by hospitals themselves, for 
example from surpluses of current expenses. This circumstance puts several hospitals into financial trou-
bles since surpluses are not meant for financing of investments. Moreover, lacking investments can cause 
erosion of structural and technical infrastructure, in extreme cases causing limitations in health care supply. 
In addition, innovative treatments and technical progress are more unlikely to be implemented when hos-
pitals lack investments in structural and medical infrastructure.  
 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show hospital investments for the German federal states in 2015 and the period 1991 
to 2015. The difference between the two figures is mostly due to an investment program for the Eastern 
federal states initiated in the course of the Health Care Structure Reform Act of 1992. It aimed to assure 
equal standards of infrastructure after the unification of Germany by providing around 10 Bn. € for invest-
ments in hospitals of Eastern Germany during the period of 1995 to 2014 (DKG, 2017). In the perspective 
                                                          
2 Adjusted costs of hospitals refer to gross hospital costs less expenses for outpatient services. 
Source: own illustration based on DKG (2017). 
Figure 5: Investment ratio of 
hospitals in federal states, 2015 
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of overall Germany, however, each federal state supplies less financial resources in real terms for invest-
ments in hospitals today compared to 1991.  
Current discussions focus on a mechanism to calculate the actual need for investments, called investment 
allocation assessment. Respective calculations have led to the projected need for investments to the 
amount of 6.01 Bn. € mentioned before (DKG, 2017). The investment allocation assessment aims to pro-
vide a basis for federal states’ decision making regarding the actual investment need of their hospitals. The 
mechanism is closely related to Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) and hence incorporates information on 
medical and demographic data (Schmid et al, 2016).  
For the sake of completeness we want to point out that some literature mentions the so-called ‚investment 
bottleneck of hospitals‘, which does not lie in the focus here. We proceed accordingly, since the amount of 
the investment bottleneck is difficult to measure in an objective way (SVR-G, 2007).This causes the ac-
cording calculated amount to differ in a broad range from e.g. 14.6 Bn. € (Augurzky et al, 2014) to 50 Bn. 
€ (DKG, 2009).  
We conclude that the German health policy observes severe challenges resulting from the dualistic frame-
work of health care financing in hospitals. We sympathize with the attempts to improve decision making in 
the context of investment allocation assessments, since they rely on actual health-related data. However, 
we find it surprising that this system does not involve a reallocation mechanism between federal states, 
since financial recourses are to some degree responsible for lagging investments. From what we will see 
in the next subsection, future challenges may even aggravate the current situation.  
2.3 Future challenges 
We described determining factors and the current situation regarding lacking investments in hospitals in 
the previous subsections. Now we will look at future developments, which are likely to have reasonable 
impacts on the existing challenge.  
First, the demographic constitution of federal states will influence the further development of hospital infra-
structure in different ways. A decreasing population will impact the financial resources of federal states due 
to the current and future design of the Federal Financial Equalization System (Lenk & Starke, 2015). More-
over, the amount of tax revenues generated depend on the number of people in employment, which is 
again affected by demographic factors. In addition, the latter also impacts the nature and extent of public 
expenditures, e.g. education for the younger population and retirement homes for elderly people.  
Figure 7 exhibits the projected old-age dependency ratio for 2030 in German federal states with highest 
values for the Eastern federal states. Literature also reveals highest increases compared to 2008 in the 
same area (Destatis, 2010). Hence, it is likely that Eastern federal states observe greater challenges when 
it comes to public financing and therefore fulfilling their public duties.  
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Projected changes in hospital cases in the period 2008 to 2030 are depicted in Figure 8. The reduction of 
hospital cases in Saxony-Anhalt is caused by a decrease in population until 2030 while Berlin and Bavaria 
are expected to cope with the opposite effect due to a slight increase of the corresponding population. 
Observed changes in hospital cases indicate towards the necessity for adjustments in the context of health 
care facilities and medical staff. A lower utilization of health care facilities is especially challenging for larger 
federal states and regions with low population density and long travel distances in the context of emergency 
care.3  
Fortunately, a so-called ‘cost explosion‘ of health care costs is not expected (Nowossadeck, 2012; Bowles 
& Greiner, 2012). The slow but long lasting impacts of demographic changes favor planning of a variety of 
activities in medical research, aiming at improved health care provision, prevention, rehabilitation and allo-
cation of resources (Nowossadeck, 2012). 
Moreover, the impact of financial resources on financing of hospitals are likely to toughen from 2020 on, 
when the debt brake is introduced (SVR-G, 2014). It prohibits federal states from incurring new debt 
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011). As already mentioned, the indebted federal states Saarland and Bremen 
receive special attention in the new German equalization scheme (BMF, 2016a).  
Furthermore, the aforementioned additional resources for hospital investments in Eastern federal states, 
which were provided from 1995 on, stopped in 2014 (DKG, 2017). This obligates Eastern federal states to 
provide an even higher amount of financial resources from 2015 on. However, this effect is expected to 
become visible with delay since hospitals in Eastern Germany currently exhibit a relatively favorable situa-
tion due to the expired additional funding (SVR-G, 2014).  
                                                          
3 Both projections are based on assumptions, which do not incorporate unexpected demographic developments occurred lately 
such as the large influx of refugees. At this point there are no revised projections available. Hence, we suggest to interpret 
this data with respect to a reasonable amount of uncertainty. 
Figure 7: Projected old-age de-
pendency ratio, 2030 
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Concluding, we observe additional challenges in the future, which may toughen the current situation of 
lagging hospital investments. In the following, we consider previous approaches, summarize the problem 
and end with a description on the proposed approach.  
3 Existing approaches and introduction to the proposed approach 
Up to this point, we have introduced the background and challenges in the context of lagging investments 
in German hospitals. This section focusses on problem solving. Therefore, we summarize existing ap-
proaches in subsection 3.1, define the problem from our perspective in subsection 3.2 and describe our 
proposed approach in subsection 3.3.  
3.1 Existing approaches 
Mentioned adjustments in the Hospital Financing Act from 2016 consist in obligating federal states to fi-
nance at least the average annual amount of 2012 to 2014 in each year from 2016 to 2018. There is con-
sensus among several associations about the inadequacy of this regulation (BÄK, 2015; GKV-Spitzen-
verband, 2015; vdek, 2015; VUD-MFT, 2015). Accordingly, it represents an absolute lower limit of invest-
ments but appears to be the only compromise federal states are willing to accept (vdek, 2015).  
The German Advisory Council on the Assessment of Developments in the Healthcare System pursues to 
introduce monistic hospital financing (SVR-G, 2007). Health insurance companies would be responsible for 
financing current expenses and investments in hospitals. The Council suggests to directly link investments 
to DRG. Consequently, a certain fund is at the free disposal of hospitals. Federal states should nevertheless 
still be able to oblige hospitals to supply certain services such as emergency care in order to maintain 
regional and social policy of federal states. The investment fund should still be financed by taxes to avoid 
additional burden for the statutory health insurance. The opposite would result in a rise of health insurance 
contribution impacting negatively on the labor market. Federal state contributions to the fund are suggested 
to be defined according to the number of inhabitants.  
This setting considers some challenges of the dualistic financing framework. First, inpatient and outpatient 
treatment is treated equally, without one of them being partly publicly financed. Second, business decisions 
in hospitals are made by one player instead of two, which is supposed to improve efficiency and economic 
profitability. Third, it decreases distorted competition among hospitals, since their equipment is no longer 
influenced by federal states’ decisions. (DIHK, 2010) Fourth, political influence on investments decisions is 
reduced, which is favorable in respect of the relationship between the short-term budgetary position and 
lagging investments in hospitals to supply needs-based health care (SVR, 2012).  
A more detailed description on the exact procedures of a potential monistic financing framework can be 
found in Rürup et al. (2008). They pursue to focus on a to-be defined share of value-added tax revenues 
as part of the current Federal Financial Equalization System. Financial resources are distributed among 
hospitals in accordance to DRG under the supervision of federal states. Ten percent of the available finan-
cial resources should be kept back for financing hospitals in disadvantaged regions.  
So far, we observe a general renunciation from the dualistic framework of hospital financing and consensus 
about relating payments to DRG. However, the source of financing is not quite clear. While the Advisory 
Council suggests tax payments in accordance to inhabitants, Rürup et al. (2008) suggests to link payments 
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to a specific amount of value-added tax. Both approaches seem relatively unsophisticated considering the 
heterogeneity among regions and the current inadequacy of federal states’ financial contribution. We pro-
pose a clear calculation method in this context to favor policy rationale. We think, multiregional input-output 
analysis is a suitable approach. 
3.2 Problem formulation 
We observe a heterogeneity of German federal states in determinants of health care expenditures, which 
are considered in financing of current costs by the concepts of the Morbi-RSA. However, no compensation 
mechanism is available to adjust budgets of federal states enabling them to meet their responsibility of 
financing hospital investments.  
This is crucial since budgetary restrictions play a decisive role in this matter. Neither the current nor the 
future Federal Financial Equalization System considers determinants of health. However, its future design 
considers e.g. expenditures for education and hence recognizes financial needs beyond general equaliza-
tion mechanisms. Therefore, it is surprising that the same mechanism lacks an equivalent adjustment in 
the context of health especially when we compare its allocation volume of 10.6 Bn. € (BMF, 2017a) with 
annual needs for hospital infrastructure of 6.01 Bn. € in 2016 (DKG, 2017). This dimensions clearly indicate 
the relevance of this topic.  
Theoretical approaches suggest to introduce a monistic financing framework, in which health insurance 
companies come up for current costs and investments. Binding federal states’ contributions are supposed 
to be the source of funding of the latter. We criticize that suggested individual contributions are not linked 
to any health related characteristics and do not show advantages over the Federal Financial Equalization 
System regarding the criticized design of the distribution mechanism. 
Hence, we aim to establish a macroeconomic model specifying each federal states’ contribution to the 
earmarked fund. This model offers reasonable explanations for due contributions of federal states in the 
context of the health economy. We propose this direct linkage to the health economy since it potentially 
promotes understanding and therefore willingness to cooperate of contributing federal states.  
3.3 Proposed approach 
In previous research we compiled the MRHA, which is a multiregional satellite account of the health econ-
omy based on the macroeconomic framework of national accounts. It reveals intra- and interregional next 
to interindustry dependencies of the German economy with special emphasis on health. The model enables 
input-output analysis in order to examine triggered indirect relationships next to the direct contributions of 
the health economy to the regional economy. Hence, instead of relying on indicators such as the number 
of inhabitants to establish an earmarked fund for hospital investments, we make use of modelled interde-
pendencies of federal states with direct link to health care supply.  
Indirect effects arise from the interconnectedness of industries and federal states in terms of exchanging 
products and services for further processing or final consumption. For example, they emerge from produc-
ing medication and therewith related necessary inputs such as energy. Federal states, which profit to an 
above average amount from patient treatment in other federal states, since they provide e.g. a high amount 
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of necessary medication or energy, accordingly contribute to the fund to a higher proportion. The allocation 
of the fund is carried out in accordance to DRG as proposed by previous approaches.  
4 Data base and empirical approach 
This section focusses on the data base used and the empirical approach pursued to establish a compen-
sation mechanism for federal states in order to enable needs-based hospital investments.  
4.1 Data base 
The MRHA represents the main data base for further calculations. This satellite account was compiled as 
a methodological enhancement of the already established NHA and aims at quantifying the economic con-
tribution of the health economy in terms of GVA, employment and trade for the German federal states. 
While the NHA reveals economic interdependencies of the health economy with the overall economy, the 
MRHA separates these interdependencies also among federal states in order to evaluate interregional next 
to interindustry dependencies. The foundation for both models is national accounts. We provide the official 
definition of national accounts in order to point out its versatility and recognition in the following. 
National accounts are a coherent, consistent and integrated set of macroeconomic accounts, balance 
sheets and tables based on a set of internationally agreed concepts, definitions, classifications and ac-
counting rules. 
National accounts provide a comprehensive accounting framework within which economic data can be 
compiled and presented in a format that is designed for purposes of economic analysis, decision-taking 
and policy-making. 
OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms 
Commissioned by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, we derived the methodology of 
the current NHA (Schwärzler & Kronenberg, 2016), elaborated the methodology to compile the MRHA 
(Schwärzler & Kronenberg, 2017a) and checked its plausibility and results (Schwärzler & Kronenberg, 
2017b) in order to address a current challenge of political matter in this paper.  
For the purpose of this analysis, we use the input-output table of the MRHA, which is derived from the 
corresponding supply and use tables. Schwärzler & Kronenberg (2016) provide a detailed description on 
the derivation of the input-output table for the NHA, which applies identically for the multiregional context.  
The derived multiregional input-output table with emphasis on the health economy provides information on 
the production process and the use of goods. Since the economies of federal states do not represent en-
closed systems but are related to each other in terms of the supply for and demand of goods and services, 
this multiregional input-output table allows to calculate interregional dependencies. Emphasis on the health 
economy enable to specifically evaluate categories of the health economy, which cannot be derived from 
official national tables neither collectively nor separately.  
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Figure 9: Multiregional input-output table in a 3-region-economy 
 
Source: Schwärzler & Kronenberg, 2017a. 
In order to provide a better understanding for the reader, we indicate towards Figure 9, which exhibits the 
framework of a multiregional input-output table for a three region economy. Included data reveals infor-
mation on inputs necessary to produce a certain amount of a specific product on the one hand and use of 
products either for further production or final use on the other hand.  
We provide the general notation according to Miller & Blair (2009) over here. Let 𝑥𝑖 be the overall produced 
output of one specific industry 𝑖, which only produces one type of good. This output is used as input 𝑧𝑖 in 𝑛 
industries or for final consumption 𝑓𝑖, such as private household consumption or exports among others.4 
𝑥𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝑧𝑖𝑗 + ⋯ + 𝑧𝑖𝑛 + 𝑓𝑖 =  ∑ 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
+ 𝑓𝑖 (1) 
Since each industry produces exactly one kind of product, we obtain 𝑛 industries and hence an nX(n+1) 
matrix, the plus one indicating to final consumption as a single vector. In matrix notation we get 
𝑥 = 𝑍𝑖 + 𝑓 (2) 
where 𝑖 denotes a column vector of 1’s resulting in a row-wise summation of 𝑍. 
4.2 Empirical approach 
We aim to establish a fund for hospital investments, into which federal states make payments according to 
their direct and indirect benefits from patient treatment in the rest of the country. Input-output analysis 
                                                          
4 For the sake of consistency with existing literature, we refer to final consumption as a vector. 
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represents the foundation for quantifying indirect effects. In the following we describe the basics of input-
output analysis, according to Miller & Blair (2009).  
In this context, we rely on the Leontief production function, which is characterized by fixed proportions of 
inputs. To obtain additional output, all involved inputs need to be increased proportionally. Hence, there is 
a direct relationship between necessary inputs and obtained output, defined by the ‘technical coefficient’ 
𝑎𝑖𝑗 =  
𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑥𝑗
 (3) 
Hence, we can replace 𝑧𝑖𝑗 by 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑗 in equation (2) resulting in  
𝑥 = 𝐴𝑥 + 𝑓 (4) 
If we want to calculate the amount of output 𝑥 necessary to supply a specific amount of final demand 𝑓, we 
solve equation (4) for 𝑥 and receive the Leontief inverse multiplied by 𝑓 
𝑥 = (𝐼 − 𝐴)−1 𝑓 = 𝐿𝑓 (5) 
This procedure is special since it calculates round-by-round effects. In the first round, output of one product 
requires a certain amount of inputs. Those inputs have to be produced themselves, which leads to the 
second round of effects. Adding all rounds of effects results in a single number from an entire series, caused 
by economic interdependencies.  
Table 1 exhibits exemplary results of direct and indirect effects from patient treatment. Since we only want 
to focus on effects in the rest of the country, diagonal elements are blanked.5 The resulting distribution is 
applied on the given amount of the fund to define each federal state’s contribution. The underlying argument 
is that federal states, which profit from patient treatment in the rest of the country should also be made 
responsible for investments necessary over there in order to keep up needs-based health care supply.  
Table 1: Exemplary results of the allocation mechanism. 
 
Source: own illustration. 
When we define each federal state’s tax contribution to the fund, we will focus on results in terms of GVA. 
Reason for this approach is a similar challenge in the Federal Financial Equalization System. As mentioned, 
the latter aims to distribute unequally generated taxes among federal states to ensure the latter are capable 
to fulfill their duties. Before it gets to the point of re-distributing taxes, however, generated taxes in overall 
                                                          
5 We provide arguments for this approach in subsection 5.2.  
R1 R2 R3 R4 Σ %
R1 … 3 1 4 8 9%
R2 10 … 23 15 48 52%
R3 13 9 … 3 25 27%
R4 5 2 5 … 12 13%
93 100%
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Germany have to be allocated to their ‘rightful’ owner, which is currently carried out according to the prin-
ciple of local origin. This becomes tricky when it comes to multiregional companies or employees, who 
commute over borders of federal states. Special adjustment rules come into action in such situations, which 
are, however, heavily discussed in the current design of the Federal Financial Equalization System. Con-
sequently, Lenk & Glinka (2015) derive the advantages of allocating taxes according to GVA generated in 
federal states, due to advancements in transparency and allocation with respect to economic power. Hence, 
we focus on direct and indirect effects from patient treatment in the rest of the country in terms of GVA in 
order to define each federal state’s contribution to the earmarked fund for hospital investments. 
Table 2: Categories of the health economy referring to ‚patient treatment‘.  
 
Source: own illustration based on BMWI (2017a). 
We define ‘patient treatment’ as public and private expenditures on health according to the health expendi-
ture survey. This corresponds to the categories of the health economy shown in the Table 2.6 In the follow-
ing analysis, we define three categories: Medication, medical products and inpatient/outpatient treatment 
including administration, where the latter refers to ‘health insurance’ depicted in Table 2. Retail trade and 
wholesale trade is separately assigned to the corresponding products, which is medication and medical 
products. 
Correspondingly, our main foundation for this calculation, the MRHA, incorporates these categories of 
health, which were obtained from matching compiled multiregional supply and use tables with regional 
health expenditures. Hence, in technical terms, we calculate direct and indirect input-output effects from 
current household and government consumption of categories of the health economy shown in Table 2, 
based on the standard static open model  
At this point we introduced background and challenges of lagging investments in hospitals, described ex-
isting strategies and our proposed approach and explained foundations of the empirical framework. On the 
basis of this, we show and discuss results in the next section.  
                                                          
6 These categories only refer to the ‚core area‘ of the health economy. All categories of the health economy – includ-
ing the ‘extended area’ of the health economy - are depicted in Schwärzler & Kronenberg (2016). 
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5 Results and discussion 
This section focusses on the results from input-output analysis. Based thereon, we compile the theoretical 
fund size for hospital investments in a specific federal state according to direct and indirect GVA generated 
by patient treatment in the rest of Germany. Subsection 5.1 describes the results and subsection 5.2 dis-
cusses further implications.  
5.1 Results 
In our understanding, the economic constitution of the health economy plays a decisive role to supply 
needs-based health care in hospitals. Yet, the health economy does not operate individually within each 
federal state, but depends on products and services from other federal states, i.e. the “rest of the country”. 
Hence, this interdependency implies that certain federal states profit from patient treatment in the rest of 
the country. This, however, contradicts the dualistic financing of hospitals, according to which investments 
have to be financed by the responsible federal states exclusively. 
Therefore, we pursue the discussion on a compensation mechanism, which is derived from interregional 
dependencies of the health economy. Direct and indirect GVA generated in federal states due to the treat-
ment of patients in the rest of the country is the main directive to define contributions to the fund. We 
suggest that federal states, which profit above average from patient treatment in the rest of the country, are 
obligated to make a greater contribution to the earmarked fund.  
The overall amount of this fund corresponds to 5.85 Bn. € for 2015, which is derived from investment allo-
cation assessments (DKG, 2017). We refer to 2015, since it represents the most recent data base of federal 
states’ actual investments. We are aware of occurring inaccuracies when applying this amount to modelled 
interregional interdependencies based on data from 2011. Since it is our primary objective to bring the 
underlying mechanisms into the reader’s attention, we ignore occurring inaccuracies in the following.  
Table 3 exhibits the results from input-output analysis. Summed up over all federal states, we obtain an 
overall amount of around 48 Bn. € GVA from patient treatment in the rest of the country. We derive individual 
payments to the fund according to the contribution of each federal state to this amount, indicated by the red 
frame in Table 3.  
This amount comprises of different categories, which is medication, medical products and inpatient/outpa-
tient treatment including administration. The latter provides the majority of GVA effects generated, while 
the first exhibits the highest effects in terms of GVA generated per 100 € spent on this kind of treatment. 
This is comprehensible, since health products experience trade between federal states and are therefore 
responsible for a high degree of interdependencies among federal states for each Euro spent in the rest of 
the country. Inpatient and outpatient treatment is not part of interregional trade, since this service always 
takes place at the supplying federal state. This causes GVA generated per 100 € spent on inpatient and 
outpatient treatment in the rest of the country to be of a lower amount compared to health products. How-
ever, inpatient/outpatient treatment and administration represent the biggest contributor to the overall health 
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economy, which makes this part nonetheless powerful in its absolute importance. Its corresponding inter-
regional dependencies come along with necessary inputs like medication and medical products for inpatient 
and outpatient treatment, but also with energy and food among others.  
Table 3: Direct & indirect GVA effects from patient treatment in the rest of country.  
 
Source: own calculations. 
By comparing the contribution of each federal state with its share on the overall national economy in terms 
of GVA, we observe an above or below average advantage from patient treatment in the rest of the country. 
For example, the federal states Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Hesse and Rhineland-Palatinate profit above 
average when patients in the rest of the country are treated with medication, since their corresponding GVA 
share is higher than their share on the national economy. This is legitimate due to large companies oper-
ating over there. The companies Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH and Merck KGaA characterize Hesse 
as a federal state with strong focus on medication manufacturing (Schwärzler & Kronenberg, 2017b). Berlin 
exhibits emphases in R&D in medication especially due to activities of Bayer HealthCare AG, Berlin-Chemie 
AG and Pfizer Deutschland GmbH. An established cluster in this field and close cooperation between the 
pharmaceutical industry and health facilities intensify Berlin’s activities in corresponding R&D. Boehringer 
Ingelheim GmbH has high impact on medication supply in Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate. 
Supply of medication goes in hand with several other indirect effects in these federal states (Schwärzler & 
Kronenberg, 2017b).  
Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg profit from expenditures on medical products in the rest of Germany. 
Activities in this field have extraordinary importance in these federal states (Forum MedTech Pharma e.V., 
2015; BW-I, 2015) and exhibit essential interindustry and interregional effects (Schwärzler & Kronenberg, 
2017b). Both federal states show accompanying regional effects from computer, electronic and optical 
products next to a strong relationship to machinery in Baden-Württemberg.  
As already mentioned, inpatient and outpatient treatment are themselves not subject to interregional trade. 
However, an essential share of their input does, such as medication, medical products or further services 
Regional 
economy
[M.  € GVA] [share]
[€ GVA per 
100 € exp.]
[M.  € GVA] [share]
[€ GVA per 
100 € exp]
[M.  € GVA] [share]
[€ GVA per 
100 € exp]
[M.  € GVA] [share]
[€ GVA per 
100 € exp]
[share]
BW 3,012 17.2% 8.40 930 18.0% 7.11 3,394 13.4% 1.73 7,335 15.3% 2.99 15.0%
BY 1,472 8.4% 4.21 1,050 20.3% 8.18 4,180 16.5% 2.21 6,702 14.0% 2.82 17.7%
BE 1,729 9.9% 4.43 149 2.9% 1.04 1,313 5.2% 0.61 3,191 6.7% 1.19 4.0%
BB 363 2.1% 0.92 74 1.4% 0.51 501 2.0% 0.23 937 2.0% 0.34 2.1%
HB 108 0.6% 0.27 57 1.1% 0.38 248 1.0% 0.11 412 0.9% 0.15 1.0%
HH 525 3.0% 1.33 228 4.4% 1.56 1,023 4.0% 0.47 1,777 3.7% 0.65 3.6%
HE 3,989 22.8% 10.55 472 9.1% 3.39 3,100 12.2% 1.49 7,562 15.8% 2.91 8.7%
MV 74 0.4% 0.19 36 0.7% 0.25 275 1.1% 0.12 386 0.8% 0.14 1.3%
NI 661 3.8% 1.82 397 7.7% 2.96 1,959 7.7% 0.96 3,017 6.3% 1.19 8.7%
NW 2,937 16.8% 9.12 1,115 21.5% 9.37 5,612 22.2% 3.23 9,664 20.1% 4.43 21.8%
RP 1,361 7.8% 3.50 155 3.0% 1.08 1,006 4.0% 0.47 2,522 5.3% 0.94 4.4%
SL 124 0.7% 0.31 52 1.0% 0.35 280 1.1% 0.13 456 0.9% 0.16 1.2%
SN 248 1.4% 0.64 120 2.3% 0.84 845 3.3% 0.39 1,213 2.5% 0.45 3.7%
ST 244 1.4% 0.62 63 1.2% 0.43 487 1.9% 0.22 794 1.7% 0.29 1.9%
SH 429 2.5% 1.09 198 3.8% 1.36 693 2.7% 0.32 1,320 2.8% 0.49 2.8%
TH 196 1.1% 0.50 77 1.5% 0.52 406 1.6% 0.19 679 1.4% 0.25 1.9%
Σ 17,471 100% 2.85 5,173 100% 2.29 25,322 100% 0.75 47,967 100% 1.14 100%
Medication Medical products
Inpatient/outpatient 
treatment & administration
Σ
patient treatment
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and products related with daily business. This implies high effects for Berlin, Hesse and North Rhine-West-
phalia due to their supply of medication. Moreover, high effects arise in administration in Berlin due its 
characteristic as capital of Germany and in financial activities in Hesse, due to the city of Frankfurt hosting 
several important players such as the European Central bank, the German Central Bank and the German 
Stock Exchange among them (Schwärzler & Kronenberg, 2017b; IAB, 2013). In addition, North Rhine-
Westphalia profits from inpatient and outpatient treatment in terms of energy supply, since it provides about 
a third of overall German energy output. Hamburg benefits from a wide range in related services, such as 
trade and warehousing next to insurance, legal, accounting, rental and leasing services. 
Summing up all direct and indirect GVA effects from patient treatment in the rest of Germany results in the 
already mentioned amount of around 48 Bn. €. The more a federal states profits from this effect, the more 
it should be obligated to contribute to the earmarked fund. When we contrast this share with the regional 
contribution to the national economy, we obtain above average effects for Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, 
Hamburg, Hesse and Rhineland-Palatinate, as can be obtained from Table 3. In the following subsection 
we will apply this allocation to the necessary amount for hospital investments and discuss the results.  
5.2 Discussion 
In the previous subsection, we have derived each federal state’s contribution to the earmarked fund for 
hospital investments. The rationale behind is that federal states should contribute a higher amount to the 
fund if they profit from patient treatment in the rest of the country in an extraordinary way. This subsection 
concentrates on further implications of this adjustment scheme. Hence, we conduct another input-output 
analysis, which focusses on the direct and indirect GVA effects, which arise from current investments in 
hospitals. We proceed accordingly in order to examine the subsequent step of establishing a fund for in-
vestments, which is direct and indirect GVA effects from investments in hospitals.  
One essential point is that federal states do not only profit from patient treatment in the rest of the country, 
but also from investments taken over there. Hence, federal states should indeed be willing to support addi-
tional investments in the rest of the country. Even more, as can be depicted from column one and column 
two of Table 4, returns in terms of GVA generated per 100 € expenditure on investments in the rest of the 
country exceed those from patient treatment.  
Column three depicts the derived relative contributions from subsection 5.1 applied to the overall amount 
of hospital investments necessary in 2015 according to DKG (2017). When we contrast these numbers with 
actual federal states’ investments depicted in column four, it results in the current implementation rate, 
shown in column five. The only federal state with accordingly sufficient participation is Mecklenburg-West-
ern Pomerania. Not surprisingly, the five federal states, Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Hamburg, Hesse and 
Rhineland-Palatinate, which are supposed to compensate other federal states for their investments in ac-
cordance to our calculations, particularly lag behind others in their current participation.  
At this point, we want to bring the reader’s attention back to the positive effects from hospital investments 
according to the second input-output analysis conducted. Column six of Table 4 depicts the absolute 
amount of each federal state’s current direct and indirect GVA generated by hospital investments in overall 
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Germany. Therefore, we calculate the current gap arising between current expenditures on investments 
and GVA generated due to investments taken. It follows, that from an overall investment amount of 2,794 
M. € in 2015 (DKG, 2017) direct and indirect GVA arises in federal states to the amount of 2,035 M. €. In 
consideration of this significant amount we suggest to provide more room for a discussion regarding the 
upsides of investment financing of hospitals in the current political debate.  
Table 4: Relationship of patient treatment and hospital investments.  
 
Source: own calculations, *DKG (2017). 
Next to the additional GVA effects just described, we want to turn to some aspects of more technical nature 
in the following. There may arise a question on why we refer to GVA effects generated by patient treatment 
in the rest of the country exclusively in order to calculate individual contributions of federal states, instead 
of adding effects from treatment in the own federal state.  
First, the provided framework is supposed to make involved players aware of the importance and ad-
vantages of interregional dependencies for the economy. We believe that if we promote this awareness, it 
will lead to a higher willingness for any sort of compensation mechanism. Second, we do not intend to 
interfere with regional policy, which means corresponding decisions regarding general regional health care 
supply should not impact on the federal state’s contribution to the fund. Otherwise, we think, this could 
affect federal states’ incentives to supply needs-based health care in yet unknown directions.  
In addition, one may question whether this compensation mechanism impacts on the federal state’s strate-
gic decision regarding their export activities. Federal states would indeed reduce their contribution to the 
compensation mechanism if they substitute their sales to the rest of the country by international sales. 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
Effects from 
patient 
treatment in 
ROC
Effects from 
investments 
in ROC
Calculated 
contribution 
to fund [2015]
Current 
investments 
[2015]*
Implementati
on rate
Effects from 
investments 
Current gap 
(C4/C3) (C4-C6)
[€ GVA per 100 € 
expenditure]
[€ GVA per 100 € 
investments]
[M . € contribut ion] [M . €] % [M . € GVA] [M . €]
BW 2.99 7.00 895 437 49 289 148
BY 2.82 9.64 817 500 61 387 113
BE 1.19 2.11 389 96 25 86 10
BB 0.34 0.98 114 83 72 46 36
HB 0.15 0.44 50 39 77 21 18
HH 0.65 1.17 217 91 42 48 43
HE 2.91 4.88 922 242 26 198 44
MV 0.14 0.67 47 53 112 33 20
NI 1.19 3.97 368 276 75 173 102
NW 4.43 10.39 1,179 515 44 381 134
RP 0.94 2.00 308 120 39 83 37
SL 0.16 0.51 56 29 51 21 8
SN 0.45 2.94 148 131 89 118 13
ST 0.29 1.09 97 39 40 40 -1
SH 0.49 1.12 161 94 59 50 45
TH 0.25 1.58 83 50 60 60 -10
Σ 1.14 2.96 5,850 2,794 48 2,035 759
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However, companies operate to maximize their profit and therefore look for possibilities all over the world 
to sale their products. Hence, there is no reason to substitute sales if there is a possibility to increase sales. 
In addition, federal states probably will not interfere with certain incentives for companies due to additional 
domestic effects accompanied with interregional trade.  
6 Concluding remarks 
This work and the underlying model, the MRHA, focus on the economic effects of the health economy in 
German federal states. Clearly, the perspective on health care as an economic contributor can be criticized. 
In this perception, the patient is no longer the focus of respective analyses. Related analyses even suggest 
advantages for the health economy if there is an increased need for patient treatment.  
From a scientific view, however, it is beneficial to have additional explanatory factors available for certain 
analyses. Moreover, supply of health care results in financing responsibilities, hence it is legitimate to pur-
sue the approach of “economizing of health”. The macroeconomic framework provides the opportunity to 
evaluate financing of the health care system in a different picture and puts an alternative light on e.g. in-
vestment decisions, with in turn pursue effects on demographic impacts, life expectancy and the degree of 
pain and suffering of patients.  
Both the NHA and the MRHA are macroeconomic models for the German health economy. However, over 
the years we recognized that the first lacks a certain necessary degree of differentiation. This is the reason 
we developed the MRHA. It exhibits important regional characteristics and reveals interregional and inter-
industry dependencies. Due to its existence we are able to address the current political challenge of lacking 
investments in German hospitals. This is one example for the close connection between expenses of the 
health system and its economic contribution at the same time, since federal states are obligated to finance 
hospital investments from tax revenues.  
Due to the circumstance that budgets of federal states influence the amount of hospital investments taken, 
we developed a financial equalization scheme based on modelled interdependencies of federal states 
caused by patient treatment in the rest of the country. One advantage of this model is a high degree of 
transparency in the context of the equalization scheme. Another advantage is that the model demonstrates 
further effects from actual investments. We hence argue that this model has the potential to impact on 
current policy decisions. This is especially important in the context of the inadequacies of two related policy 
decisions, which is the future design of the Federal Financial Equalization System and the current adjust-
ments in the Hospital Financing Act to cope with lagging investments. 
Clear limitations of the approach is the modelled multiregional input-output table, due to its non-availability 
from statistical offices. Our work to compile the MRHA contributes to existing scientific research in this field, 
since it incorporates new approaches and exhibits realistic findings in this and a previous paper (Schwärzler 
& Kronenberg, 2017b). In an overall perspective, we believe it is worth considering to use multiregional 
tables in the context of financial equalization schemes of federal states in general, since they incorporate 
actual information on interregional dependencies. However, there is clearly a relatively high effort of such 
a scientific-based approach associated therewith, since it would require an ongoing monitoring based on a 
regular updating of the multiregional input-output model. 
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